This paper describes two competing discourses currently at work in the public domain in Hong Kong during the period leading up to the change of sovereignty in 1997. The two discourses are labelled Utilitarian artd Confucianist. The Utilitarian discourse is characteristic of those who support greater democracy and autonomy for Hong Kong, while the Confucianist discourse is employed by representatives of China and the pro-China camp in Hong Kong. The Utilitarian discourse promotes egalitarian values and may be confrontational. The Confucianist discourse is more hierarchical and consensus-oriented in nature. The two discourses are illustrated by means of brief descriptions of a set of discursive events reported in the press and by four texts: a television news item, a television interview, and two newspaper articles.
Introduction
Hong Kong is one of the few remaining British colonies. However, in 1997, in accordance with the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1978, sovereignty is due to be passed to China and the colony will become a 'Special Administrative Region' (SAR) of that country. Although the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law (the mini-constitution for post-1997 Hong Kong, based on the Joint Declaration, and drawn up by China, with participation from Hong Kong) guarantee that the current way of life of Hong Kong will be preserved for at least 50 years, the transitional period has been characterised by much insecurity on the part of Hong Kong people over what the future holds for them as subjects of the People's Republic of China. Insecurity reached a climax with the suppression of the Tiananmen Square prodemocracy demonstrations of June 4, 1989, as a result of which many Chinese lost their lives and following which many Hong Kong people sought to emigrate or obtain foreign passports.
In the years subsequent to the events of June 4, 1989, with peaceful conditions returning to China and the emphasis of the Chinese government on reforms designed to lead to a market economy, anxiety on the part of Hong Kong people was somewhat relieved. Subsequently, however, as 1997 drew nearer, and with the arrival of a new British Governor, in 1992, who tried to introduce various constitutional reforms, and the ensuing breakdown in negotiations between Britain and China over the pace of democratic development in Hong Kong, the atmosphere again became more charged.
The arrival of the new Governor, Chris Patten, saw a change in British policy over Hong Kong. Since the signing of the Joint Declaration, Britain's policy had been to engage in quiet diplomacy with China, with a view to adapting policies to fall in line .with how China saw post-1997 Hong Kong. This policy, known as 'convergence', from the point of view of some in the British Government, led to a number of humiliating compromises on Britain's Hong Kong policy, with China insisting that she should be consulted and her approval be given for a range of issues which had not been specified at the time of the signing of the Joint Declaration. As a result, when the Prime Minister, John Major, was returned to power, following a general election, the Hong Kong Governor, Wilson, was replaced by the 'heavy-weight' politician, Chris Patten, an ex-cabinet minister, Chairman of the Conservative Party and confidant of John Major.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the change of Governor represented a distinct shift in policy. Where, in the past, the emphasis had been on co-operation with China and compromise, perhaps with an eye to longer-term Sino-British relations and trade considerations (Cradock, 1994) , the policy became much more proactive, with quite radical (for Hong Kong) political and social reforms being introduced and an affirmation of the importance of the legacy of British values which would remain in Hong Kong, following the change of sovereignty. This policy was promoted aggressively by Governor Patten, by means of a very powerful rhetoric. This rhetoric, which I have labelled elsewhere, 'The Discourse of Colonial Withdrawal' (1997) , stresses four components of Britain's purported legacy to Hong Kong, which Patten consistently proclaimed in his speeches, interviews, public meetings and other public proclamations. These four components are: a free market economy, individual freedom (with, at the same time welfare provision for the disadvantaged), the rule of law, and democracy. To what extent this discourse may or may not be based in reality or be a myth is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Flowerdew, 1997) . The important thing here is that the 'democratic' values underpinning these features of Patten's discourse are promoted within Hong Kong (not just by Patten, but, also an important sector of the media and the general public) as worth struggling for beyond 1997.
As a result of Britain's new policy and the arrival of Patten, China reacted by totally ostracising the new Governor, claiming that the reforms he introduced were in contravention of the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and other agreements between the British and Chinese governments. Given the de facto replacement of the earlier policy of convergence, China made her own plans for the change of sovereignty, affirming that Patten's reforms would be repealed and that, in particular, the Legislative Council, elected in 1995, and which according to the earlier policy was to straddle the change of sovereignty, would be replaced by an appointed, provisional legislature, until new elections, under the system envisaged before Patten, could be arranged.
Patten's reforms and China's alternative plans led to a rhetorical struggle within Hong Kong between the two opposing camps. The struggle is about what sort of a polity there will be in Hong Kong beyond 1997. What is essentially at stake, in discourse terms, are questions of who can say what to whom, how, when, and where, in the public domain. Patten and the sizeable pro-democracy camp argue for a polity based upon what this paper will refer to (after Scollon and Scollon, 1995) as a Utilitarian style of public discourse, a discourse which promotes egalitarian values and which may be confrontational.~ The public discourse style promoted by China and the pro-China camp in Hong Kong, on the other hand, referred to in the paper as Confucianist, is more hierarchical and consensus-oriented in nature.
This paper is a rather ambitious and polemical attempt to analyse the tension within Hong Kong society over the handover of sovereignty from Britain to China, as it is realised and instantiated in these two very different competing styles of public discourse, the Utilitarian discourse promoted by Patten and his supporters, and the Confucianist discourse promoted by China and the pro-China camp in Hong Kong.
What this paper tries to get to grips with is what are referred to by others as 'discourses' (e.g. Kress, 1989) , or 'orders of discourse' (Fairclough, 1989 (Fairclough, , 1992 . A key feature of discourses, or orders of discourse, as discussed by these authors, is that they are in a constant state of change. The application of labels to characterise particular discourses might seem tc run counter to the notion of discourses, therefore, by reifying what are essentially evolving systems. Nevertheless, especially if it is possible to trace the development of particular discourses back through history and show how they have evolved, brat at the same time maintained certain core characteristics, it is useful to have labels in order to distil these essential features. This is especially true when considering two discourses which are in contrast, or conflict, as is the case with the Utilitarian aad Confucianist discourses in Hong Kong. In drawing out key features of the discourses, as manifested in the data of this paper, therefore, while there is a danger of ,3vergeneralizing, it is hoped to highlight the fundamental conflict currently going on in Hong Kong.
The paper is organised as follows. First the salient features of the two discourses, are outlined, based upon a reading of the literature. Next, a range of what I will refer to as discursive events, or situations, which have featured in the media and which highlight these contrasting styles, are described. Finally, the two styles are illustrated, as they are instantiated in four texts: a television news report, a television interview. and two newspaper articles.
Utilitarian discourse
The term Utilitarian is used by Scollon and Scollon (1995) to describe a discourse, or discourse system, as they pr&er to call it, which has come to prevail most notably
While Patten supports what we shall see are the Utilitarian discourse values promoted by the prodemocracy camp in Hong Kong and of T:en holds this grouping up as worthy of admiration (Sum, 1995) , he has nevertheless held them in check, in practice, because they want more political reform than he is willing to allow. This is a case of an appeal to Utilitarian values, in theory, but a manipulation of them in practice, a common enough state of affairs among those purporting to support these values, as will be pointed out below. in the United States and Great Britain, but which extends to other countries. The Utilitarian discourse has its roots for Scollon and Scollon (1995) in the European Enlightenment, although it can be traced back further, to the democratic ideals originating in ancient Greece.
Just as there is no universal definition of democracy, so is there no universal definition of democratic discourse (but see Gastil, 1993) . However, a number of characteristics which would contribute to an ideal democratic discourse can be enumerated. These would include equality of opportunity to speak, truthfulness, rationality, openness, clarity, and co-operation. Western rhetoric, with its basis in the public debate of the agora of ancient Greece, is imbued with such democratic values (Steiner, 1985; Chilton, 1985) . 2 As Chilton (1985: xiii) has stated, "The rise of rhetoric in classical Greece was integral with the emergence of democratic forms of social organisation, whatever its later restrictions and ossifications". Although the study of rhetoric was neglected in Europe during the Middle Ages, with the return during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to the study of the Ancients, these values were resurrected and developed within the movement that came to be known as the Enlightenment.
It is the ideas embodied in the Enlightenment, which, as noted by Scollon and Scollon (1995) , were carried across the Atlantic, notably in the writings of the philosophers Montesquieu, Locke, Bentham, Kant and Mill and the capitalist economist, Adam Smith, with their emphasis on freedom of the individual, reason, and the rule of law, which provide the ideological foundation for what Scollon and Scollon refer to as the Utilitarian discourse system. The freedoms attaching to Utilitarian discourse are enshrined in the first amendment of the American Constitution, which establishes the freedom of the press. The ideas put forward by Grice (1978) in 'The Logic of Conversation', with its co-operative principle and four maxims (reproduced below) which Grice claims guide all co-operative communicative behaviour, seem to be related to some sort of democratic ideal and to the democratic values of the Utilitarian discourse listed above (see Lakoff, 1990 , on this).
Co-operative Principle
Make your contributions such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
Maxim of Quality
Do not say what you believe to be false or do not have evidence for.
Maxim of Quantity
Be as informative as required.
2 It is important to note that these values were only extended to an elite group. Women and slaves, most notably were excluded. As we shall see, in the colonial period, also, the democratic values promoted in the mother country were not applied to the colonized, a situation which remains right up to the present day in Hong Kong.
Maxim of Relation
Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner
Avoid ambiguity and obscurity; be brief and orderly. Carbaugh (1989 , cited in Scollon, 1993 traces the Utilitarian discourse we have been outlining right through to the talk shows on contemporary American television.
In talking of Utilitarian (or indeed Confucianist) discourse it is important to bear in mind that we are putting a label on a discourse style which appeals to certain values. Such appeals may well be, and often are, cosmetic or manipulative (Fairclough, 1992) . Many so-called Western democracies fall well short of fulfilling the democratic values they claim to uphold. The plight of the poor, racial minorities, women, and those with minority sexual ,3rientations in many/most of the Western democracies are examples of how the democratic values of the Utilitarian discourse do not extend to all social groups within so-called democratic societies. In the context of colonialism, it should be noted that the democratic, egalitarian values cherished by the colonialists were not usually extended to the colonised. As the Utilitarian political philosopher, 3 J.S. Mill, put it (cited in Scollon and Scollon, 1995:116) , in his book, On Liberty: "This doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties ... we may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage. Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justiSed by actually effecting that end." Although this attitude is now outdated and would be considered racist, vestiges of it still remain in present-day Hong Kong, where fully representative democracy has never been introduced. Utilitarian discourse is manifested in a style which appeals to democratic ideals (just as, as we shall see later, Confucianist discourse appeals to Confucianist ideals), but it is a~a idealisation which does not occur in actuality and which may be distorted and manipulated, as well as evolving over time.
Confucianist discourse
In describing Western Utilitzxian values at work in shaping discourse in contemporary Hong Kong a historical perspective was taken and the way the Utilitarian discourse has developed over time in the West, since the Greeks, was described. A parallel historical analysis can be: adduced to explain the Confucianist discourse of China, with its associated authoritarianism. Kirkpatrick (1995) (see also . Oliver, 1971) explicitly contrasts the historical development of Chinese rhetoric wilh that of classical Greece: the law courts where the citizens 4 enjoyed equal status and where proof and facts were of importance. This contrasts tellingly with the political origins of Chinese rhetoric where people did not enjoy equal status and the primary function of rhetoric was the persuasion of superiors by their inferiors as to their future conduct.
Just as it is possible to trace the Utilitarian discourse from the time of Aristotle and the Greeks up to the present day in the West, so is it possible to trace a similar process from the time of Confucius up to the present day in contemporary China. Kirkpatrick notes that, in spite of periodic upheavals such as the communist revolution of 1949, for millennia, China has been a hierarchical society. The traditional hierarchical and autocratic nature of Chinese society, Kirkpatrick argues, may help to explain the indirectness of Chinese discourse. Because Chinese society has traditionally been a hierarchical one, Kirkpatrick claims, argument and persuasion, when they occur at all, are from an inferior to a superior. This in turn requires an indirect method of reasoning. Indirectness in Chinese discourse is a characteristic which has been noted by Western scholars since at least the last century. Kirkpatrick cites Smith, who as long ago as 1894 (well before Grice we might note) contrasted the 'Anglo-Saxon' habit of going directly to the point with the Chinese habit of indirection:
"'Next to a competent knowledge of the Chinese language, large powers of inference are essential to anyone who is to deal successfully with the Chinese." (Smith, 1984 : 66, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1995 A discourse style is concerned as much with what is not said as with what is said. One way of being indirect is to say nothing at all. An important feature of Confucian discourse is that less value is placed on the Utilitarian discourse values of openness, clarity and equality of opportunity to speak, and more value put on silence, which may be an obligation for those in subordinate positions and a prerogative of those in authority. In the words of the Confucian classics "Those who know do not speak. Those who speak do not know".
Other scholars have conceptualised the indirectness of Chinese discourse within the paradigm of high-context and low-context cultures (Hall, 1976 (Hall, , 1983 TingToomy, 1988) . High context cultures such as those of China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam prefer to use high-context messages in which very little of the meaning is transmitted in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. Low context cultures such as those of the U.S. and Western Europe, on the other hand, prefer to use lowcontext messages in which most of the information is presented in the explicit code.
Confucianist/high context and Utilitarian/low-context cultures have also been differentiated on the basis of collectivism and individualism (e.g. Bond and Forgas, 1984; Chua and Gudykunst, 1987; Hofstede and Bond, 1984) . High-context cultures are collectivist; intentions and meanings are situated within the larger shared knowledge of the cultural context. Low-context cultures are individualistic; intentions are clearly displayed and have direct correspondence with verbal patterns (Ting-Toomy, 1988) . (This, of course, makes it more easy to find features of Utilitarian discourse in actual texts than it is to identify features of Confucianist discourse.) 4 Although not the other social groups, most notably women and slaves.
Tracing this notion of individualism vs. collectivism back historically, Oliver (1971) contrasts the democratic egalitarianism of the English philosopher Locke with the collectivist authoritarianism of the early Confucianist Hsun-tze. Both noted that men are born equal but because of different social and educational conditions grow up to be unequal. From this Locke concluded that states should equalise opportunities so that all men might be equal. Hsun-tze, on the other hand, emphasised the needs of the community in general, and the necessity of having men at all ranks to fulfil society's essential services
The authoritarian attitude to society and communication within society is noted by Oliver (1971: 97) in Confucius himself:
"'Confucius agreed with the view that sc,cial needs must take priority over individual preferences. This was the basis for the Confucian political philosophy of subordination and respect for established authority. It also led the great sage to advise the people of his time: 'Do not talk of policies when you are not in a position to make them'."
The inherent authoritarianism of Chinese attitudes is reflected in contemporary research in social psychology. Yang (1986) reviewed 20 contemporary empirical cross-cultural studies that demonstrate that authoritarianism remains a prevalent social-psychological trait of the Chinese people up to the present day.
Confucianist/high context and Utilitarian low-context cultures can be further differentiated in terms of "face", "the public self-image that every member of a society wants to claim for himself/herself" (Brown and Levinson, 1978: 66; Scollon and Scollon, 1983) . In high-context cultures such as that of China the self is projected as a 'social' identity and is defined with reference to a network of social and personal relationships. Face is constantly being negotiated with others. In low-context cultures, on the other hand, face is the projection of one's individual identity and corresponds more closely to a person's internal state (Ting-Toomy, 1988) . Oliver (1971: 99) , again, emphasises the social nature of face in Chinese society:
"No people have learned better than did the ancient Chinese how to deliver unpalatable truth in palatable form. The preservation of face w~s among their highest social goals. However widely opinions might differ, propriety and decorum were to be preserved. For in the long run the maintenance of general harmony was of greater value than the achievement of any particular result in an individual dispute."
Before leaving this outline of Confucianist discourse and moving on to the analysis of specific discourse events and texts, something needs to be said about the place of the communist revolution and its aftermath in the order of Chinese discourse. Kirkpatrick mentions the communist revolution as one of the upheavals which periodically shake Chinese society, but, paradoxically, it might well be claimed that the arrival of the communists did little to undermine the concept of a hierarchical society; rather, it replaced one hierarchy and absolute authority (that of the Chinese emperors and warlords) with another (that of the Communist Party of China). 5 5 King (1991) stresses how Confucian social concepts remain strong in present day China, in spite of efforts on the part of the Communist Party to root out such so-called 'feudal' elements.
Analysed in terms of the individualist/collectivist dichotomy it is perhaps significant that Marxist-Leninism, with its emphasis on collectivism, fits better into the Chinese public discourse than the individualistic, Utilitarian, public discourse of the West. It is important to note also, that under China's "open door" policy and the promotion of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" under Deng Xiaoping, as King (1991: 126) points out, many of the traditional behavioural norms, which were previously censured, are now tolerated in the privatised economic sector and in interpersonal relations (although not in the public domain).
Finally, it should be emphasised that just as Utilitarian discourse is capable of exploitation, so is Confucianist discourse. As an illustration of this, China's turbulent history provides plenty of evidence of the failure on the part of the powerful to fulfil their responsibilities over those they rule over, and of a concern for the welfare of the individual over-riding that of the collective.
Some discursive events which highlight the competing discourses
Earlier, I characterised the struggle currently going on in Hong Kong as essentially being concerned with what sort of a polity there will be in Hong Kong beyond 1997 and that what is essentially at stake are questions of who is entitled to say what to whom, how, when, and where in the public domain. In order to create conditions which will determine the sort of polity each side wants to see, certain social structures and procedures need to be put in place. This is why in the early part of his governorship Patten undertook a range of reforms aimed at creating the conditions for a more democratic polity than had previously been the case under colonial rule, a polity that would embody a more 'Democratic' style of discourse. Notable among these reforms were a greater number of directly elected seats in the Legislative Council, greater accountability on the part of the government and civil service, with better access to information and performance pledges on the part of government departments, and the repeal of a range of laws restricting civil liberties and freedom of speech.
In this section of the paper a range of discoursal events which themselves instantiate the struggle over what is an appropriate public discourse are presented, as they have been reported in the media in the six months leading up to this writing. The purpose is to demonstrate the extent to which the struggle itself, in the lead up to the change of sovereignty, is the focus of much public discourse. The examples are as follows :6 Three Mainland officials visit Hong Kong to explain why China wants to repeal the Bill of Rights, a set of legislation introduced after the 1989 pro-democracy clampdown in China to reassure Hong Kong people of their personal freedoms.
The officials refuse to answer questions from the public or media, preferring to restate Beijing's position. One commentator states that their mission seemed to be to deliver the message: "Thou shalt not speak; thou shalt only listen" (South China Morning Post, 1 November, 1995).
. A plan for collective responsibility on members of the Preparatory Committee is criticised. 7 Under the plan, put forward by Mainland officials, members will not be allowed to disclose issues to be discussed by the committee. They will not be allowed to publicly voice their own views after an issue is discussed and, once a decision has been reached, all members will be expected to support it (South China Morning Post, 10 December, 1995) .
. Three days before his appointment as one of two religious leaders represented on the Preparatory Committee, the head of the Anglican church in Hong Kong, Bishop Peter Kwong-kit, delivers a public Christmas Eve message to his followers, based on the theme of the traditional Chinese proverb "saying too much is not the way to politics". "Many people pay too much attention to popularity, publicity and packaging", the bishop says. "They promote idol worshipping and are commended as great heroes. On the other hand, those who work in silence are despised. They are considered deficient in rendering lofty speeches and performing earth-shaking acts. Demonstrators shout "You turtle with you head in your shell" at Deputy Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, Chen Ziying, in protest at China's unwillingness to listen to opposing opinions during consultations held to gauge local views on how a selection committee should be set up to return a provisional legislature and choose a first Chief Executive for post-handover Hong Kong (South China Morning Post, 15 April 1996) . (Representatives of various groups had been excluded on the grounds that they opposed the setting up of the provisional legislature.)
The Hong Kong Governor, Chris Patten, reacting to demonstrations against the Beijing appointed Preparatory Committee and its plans to set up a provisional legislature, comments: "You can't govern any community successfully on the basis that you will only talk to anybody who will guarantee in advance to agree with whatever conclusion you reach". "We tolerate expressions of all sorts of opinion and it's a sign of strength and a sign of confidence if you try to embrace all shades of opinion in the debate", he says (South China Morning Post, 17 April 1996).
A prominent Catholic organisation contests a memo issued by the church hierarchy that says church members should not voice objections to the Beijingappointed Selection Committee. "It [the selection committee] is undemocratic and against the will of the Hong Kong people", a spokeswoman, Mary Yuen, says. Another prominent member, Father John Hurley, says "We're not afraid of disputes. They can be a good thing if handled properly and resolved amicably". Support for the memo is voiced by the Beijing-appointed adviser, Father John Tsang, who calls the memo "prudent" and "very reasonable" (Eastern Express, 3 May 1996).
Chinese officials say that they wish to be involved in 'joint-appraisal' of journalists coming to Hong Kong to cover the handover. Speaking at the Foreign Correspondents' Club, and reacting to the Chinese statement, Freedom Foundation director, John Schidlovsky, says that it is in China's interests to retain the environment that made Hong Kong an economic success, including the "free and unfettered exchange of ideas, access to information and tolerance of different opinions" (South China Morning Post, 4 May 1996) . Preparatory Committee member, Dr Raymond Wu Wai-yung, says he thinks the request is a good move. "Just like the Chinese style of wedding, the bride and groom get together to invite the guests", he says (Sunday Morning Post, 5 May 1996).
10. The New China News Agency accuses the Hong Kong Government of lacking in sincerity in 'leaking' to the press a list of ten requests for co-operation submitted by the Chinese side (Eastern Express, 6 May 1996) . 8
Each of the above discursive ew;nts highlights the Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses in conflict. Confucianist underpinnings which are discernible in these discursive events include the following:
-importance is attached to Collective responsibility -those in authority, once appointed, are not required to be openly accountable to the public -leadership should be by example rather than rhetoric -emphasis is put on the national (group) interest above that of the individual -importance is attached to decorum and public order -those at the top of the social/political hierarchy have a responsibility towards those below
These Confucianist underpinnings may be contrasted with the Utilitarian values which are also discernible in the example discursive events. Utilitarian values which are explicitly stated or are implicit in these examples, include the following:
-the importance of freedom to express one's views -the need to speak-out -the need for accountability to the general public of those in positions of power
Analysis of four texts
This section of the paper will analyse four texts: a television news report, a television interview, and two newspaper articles, and attempt to highlight the two conflicting discourses which underlie them.
The system known as kuan-hsi, or personal relationships, is an important feature of the Confucianist conception of social relations. It is the duty of the individual to cultivate these relationships, within which the demonstration of sincerity and the giving of 'face' is an important feature. The British Hong Kong Governor, Chris Patten, is continttally criticised by China for his lack of sincerity, a failing which can be traced right back to his arrival in Hong Kong and his refusal to consult with China before he presented his political reform programme, in 1992. His lack of cultivation of kuan-hsi, demonstration of sincerity and giving of 'face' may help explain why he has been totally ostracised by China. It is accepted practice for foreign statesmen and diplomats who have dealings with China to be dubbed a 'friend of China', an official acknowledgement that they have followed the conventions of network-building and sincerity of relations between friends. Richard Nixon, George Bush, Edward Heath, and significantly, Patten's predecessor as Governor of Hong Kong, David Wilson, are examples of Westerners who have received this accolade. Patten, on the olher hand, has received the epithets, 'prostitute', 'tango-dancer', and "sinner for a thousand years', among others. 
Text 1 Text 1

GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, RITA LAU (DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR RECREATION AND CULTURE) (IN CANTONESE, WITH ENGLISH SUB-TITLES):
If a government department suggests to RTHK about a new service, something to be promoted, I believe RTHK has the final say as to whether to accept it.
CHEUNG MAN-KWONG (LEGISLATIVE COUNCILLOR) (IN CANTONESE WITH ENGLISH SUB-TITLES):
There is an important difference between editorial independence and information sharing. If that line of demarcation is blurred it will lead to problems in the future. 
Analysis of Text 1
The first text is taken from a news broadcast on one of Hong Kong's two Englishlanguage television channels. In the extract, the presenter introduces a news item about China's requests for what were reported to be ten areas of co-operation from the British Hong Kong Government. One of China's ten supposed requests, in particular, was to be allowed air time on RTHK, the government funded, but editorially independent, radio and television organisation. The extract indicates how this demand was contested by a group of legislative councillors, who took their concerns to the Governor. The Governor, i,t seems, supported their stance, by telling them that their view on RTHK's editorial independence would be passed on to Lu Ping, the head of China's Hong Kong Affairs Office. The news item then switches to the Legislative Council, where RTHK':~ editorial freedom was debated. Here, the extract again shows the concern on the part of legislators that RTHK's editorial freedom might be compromised, but also their anxiety about the secrecy of the demands put forward by the Preparatory Committee. The position of one legislator, in particular, Emily Lau, is focused upon, and her demand that the whole issue should be brought into the public domain.
This extract is interesting for two features, in particular, which highlight the tension between China and Britain/Hong Kong and which can be identified as features of the two competing discourses. These features are, first, the desire of the Chinese side for confidentiality and the fact that their demands were not made public (the Chinese later criticised the Holag Kong Government for releasing details of the requests to the press (Eastern E~:press, 6 May, 1996)), an issue which elected legislator, Emily Lau takes issue with, and second, the question of the editorial freedom of the government-funded broadcasting organisation, RTHK. Although funded by the government, RTHK has editorial freedom and reserves the right to broadcast programmes which may contain criticism of the government and the establishment. 9 This is an issue over which there is misunderstanding. A leading Chinese official had claimed that it was common knowledge that RTHK was spending taxpayers' money and that it must therefore come under the control of the government (South China Morning Post, 23 April, 1996) . Stated in terms of the two competing discourses, the underlying values in competition here are the Utilitarian values put on freedom of expression (RTHK should be independent of the government) and the need for openness (China's requests should be part of the public domain), versus the Confucianist emphasis on the trust which should be placed in those in authority (there is no need for the requests to be made public; the government should have control over RTHK).
Text 2
Newsline, ATV World Television, 8:00 p.m., 28 April, 1996 OPENING CREDITS SALLY BLYTH (PRESENTER): Frank Ching and I are joined in the studio by a leading member of the Preparatory Committee, F.Y. Kan. Over the last week we've had the ministerial summit between the British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, and his Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, as well as the Chief Secretary, Anson Chan's, visit to Beijing. During both these sets of talks the legitimacy of the Provisional Legislative Council has featured high on the agenda, as well as concerns over the future of the civil service ... 9 Nevertheless, on a monthly basis, it broadcasts an edition of 'Letter to Hong Kong', taken up by a message delivered by the governor commenting on current political issues. FRANK CH1NG: ... welcome to the studio Mr. Kan. The visit to Beijing by Anson Chan, 1 think, has improved the atmosphere quite a bit, at least judging by the newspaper reports, but in spite of that I think there is still a widespread feeling within Hong Kong that the Preparatory Committee itself is not representative enough ah in that it doesn't have any directly elected Legco members for instance. Do you agree with that feeling? F.Y. KAN: I don't think I agree with that feeling. The Preparatory Committee has got more than ninety Hong Kong people and each of them have got their own sphere of operation and throughout their work in the past years they are quite well known to Hong Kong people. FRANK CHING: So you think it is representative enough? F.Y. KAY: Well, I think, you know it's a matter of degree, you know, when you ask for the utmost it is something that each one will have to form his own opinion. FRANK CHING: Oh, but I don't think people are asking for the utmost LAUGHTER I thing that they're just asking that it includes the most popular political party in Hong Kong. F.Y. KAN: Well, taking the view you know taking the people from the commerce industries are concerned, I mean, I have read Chinese, Chinese newspapers giving some of the members as being in control, of being in control, of almost one third of the quoted stocks in Hong Kong, the value of them, I mean if you take that as a measure to see whether these people are representative enough of the people in the commerce and industry it's a very good example that they are. SALLY BLYTH: Well, I think you may feel that it is representative and I hear your argument, but you can't get away from the fact that the perception is that it's not and that it's very much people who are going to voice the views which Beijing wants to hear who have been appointed to that committee and the example in point was in fact the votes in the last four meetings of the Preparatory Committee in Beijing when every member except one voted in favour of the setting up the Provisional Legislature and that one person who didn't vote was subsequently threatened. F.Y. KAN: So? SALLY BLYTH: Well, clearly that is not representative of the views of Hong Kong that what I am trying to say that is the exact example of how the Preparatory Committee is voting in favour of what Beijing wants it to vote in favour of. F.Y. KAN: I think I would I wouldn't like to go into debate on this issue, you know the Preparatory Committee is formed and you know who they are and you can judge the past records of these people as to how representative or not representative they are.
Analysis of Text 2
The second text is from a current affairs television programme, Newsline, broadcast by Hong Kong's second English-language channel, ATV World. It is the first part of an interview of a local, Hong Kong member of China's Preparatory Committee, F.Y. Kan, by the programme's two presenters, Sally Blyth and Frank Ching.
After an introduction by Sally Blyth, Frank Ching challenges Kan on the representativeness of the Preparatory Committee, in that it does not have any directly elected ,members of the LEGCO (Legislative Council). Representativeness, he thereby suggests, means inclusion of those who have been elected by popular franchise. Kan's response, however, indicates that he has a different conception of representativeness. For him, representativeness means that members should be from different spheres of society and that they should be well known to the Hong Kong people from "their work in the past years". 1° After another exchange, Ching again suggests that representativeness should mean inclusion of popularly elected political figures. Again, however, Kan disagrees, this time considering representativeness in terms of control of capital. ("I have read Chinese newspaper giving some of the members being in control ... of almost one third of the quoted stocks in Hong Kong"). At this point Sally Bly'Eh intervenes, accusing the Mainland government of appointing to the Preparatory Committee only people that will express the views that they want to hear and of "threatening" the only member who refused to join the consensus. I1 Kan finds no problem with this accusation, however, merely asking "So?". In response, Blyth can only reiterate her point that the Preparatory Committee is not representative of the views of Hong Kong people and that it is voting in favour of what Beijing wants it to do. Kan concludes this segment by stating that he does not wish to debate the issue and reiterating that committee members should be judged by their past records.
In this extract we see, on the one hand, the two presenters promoting the Utilitarian values of representativeness as measured by popular franchise, the need to speak out, and the right to disagree. Oa the other hand, we have the interviewee promoting the Confucianist values of representativeness as measured by public reputation, power (in terms of control of capital) and respect for work of past years (and hence seniority and loyalty), and the need for unanimity and consensus.
Text 3
Text 3
Selection worries
Margaret Ng
After two days of discussions, t'ae sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee has come up with broad principles but no concrete method for the formation of the Selection Committee -the all important group which will select the chief executive in the name of the people of Hong Kong. Some of these broad principles bear re-thinking.
Effectively replacing the governor, the chief executive will have great powers under the Basic Law. As someone standing between Hong Kong and China, his integrity, ability and credibility are clearly of crucial importance.
... The credibility of the chief executive depends most fundamentally on the way he is selected. This is well recognised by China, or the Basic Law would not have been littered with so many assurances of the representativeness of the method of his selection.
It is plain that election by universal suffrage is the best means, and the only means of guaranteeing credibility. However, even when China is not prepared to allow such an election, ~0 The Preliminary Committee, in addition to not appointing directly elected LEGCO members, was also accused of weighting the committee too heavily in favour of wealthy representatives of the commercial sector. J~ This is a reference to the Frederick Fung, the only elected, pro-democracy appointee on the Preparatory Committee, As Sally Blyth indicates, he voted against the motion to set up the provisional legislature. This is the topic of example discursive event no. 4, above.
credibility and a process of maximum representativeness with the least intervention from Beijing must ever be the criteria.
It is in this context that the principles adopted earlier this week for the formation of the Selection Committee are questionable. As reported, one requirement for the serving on the Selection Committee is that one has to "recognise the duty" of the committee in setting up the provisional legislature .... An honest person will ... have to ask: "if I am opposed to the setting up of the provisional legislature as decided by the Preparatory Committee on March 24, do I fail to meet the requirement?" ... Whether the criteria enjoined upon the Preparatory Committee by the 1990 decision that the Selection Committee be "broadly representative" has been met will be open to challenge, with the result that the selection of the chief executive will be open to challenge.
A chief executive so selected will be operating under a severe disadvantage because his credibility will be in question.
The only proper approach, in my opinion, is to impose no requirement as to political views .... This is what should happen in a democratic election, or any election in which representativeness is the aim and criterion.
The process the PC is heading for is going to be one which will be challenged as having a built-in mechanism of pre-selection. (South China Morning Post, 17 May 1996, p. 21) 
Analysis of Text 3
Text 3 is extracted from an article by Margaret Ng, a barrister and legislative councillor representing the legal profession, a grouping which had rejected the idea put forward by China and its Hong Kong supporters for a provisional legislature, on the grounds that such a body was not foreseen in either the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law.12 The article is a clear example of the Utilitarian discourse.
In the article Ng criticises the basis on which a sub-committee of the Preparatory Committee has chosen to select the committee that will select the future chief executive. As in the previous interview data (text 2), the key issue here is that of representativeness. For Ng, representativeness should only mean one thing, appointment based on universal suffrage -"universal suffrage is the best means, and the only means of guaranteeing credibility". However, given that China will not allow such a process for the selection of the chief executive, "credibility and a process of maximum representativeness with the least intervention from Beijing must ever be the criteria". These criteria are not met, however, according to Ng, because a prerequisite of involvement in the selection process for the chief executive is to at the same time recognise the need for the committee to set up a provisional legislature. 13 Effec-~2 China declared that the legislature operating under British rule would have to be closed down, on the grounds that the electoral arrangements which brought it into being were in contravention of previous agreements between Britain and China (a view contested by Britain). The current legislature would be replaced by a provisional legislature made up of appointees, while fresh electoral arrangements were made for a permanent body. ~3 This is a prerequisite stated by those responsible for the selection committee. A provisional legislature, however, was not foreseen in either the Joint Declaration or the Basic Law, and was strongly criticised by the British Hong Kong government and the pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong.
tively, therefore, the selection committee will not be representative, in so far as it will not allow participation by those who do not approve of the setting up of the provisional legislature. This leads Ng to argue that there should be no restriction on the political views of those involved in the selection process for the chief executive, as would happen "in a democratic election, or any election in which representativeness is the aim and criterion". Ng concludes by claiming that the whole procedure will have "a built-in mechanism for pre-selection".
As already mentioned, in this text we have a very clear example of the Utilitarian discourse. Positive value is put e.n representativeness and democracy, both of which should be based upon universal suffrage. Without these those who govern have no credibility. The idea of consen,;us (a Confucianist value), as put forward by the Preparatory Committee in making support for the provisional legislature a prerequisite for participation in the selection process for the chief executive, is criticised, on the grounds that it compromises the need for universal suffrage.
Text 4
Text 4
Folly to tamper with a good thing
David Chu
The Legislative Council last Wednesday approved by 38 votes to one the motion for a review of the present statutory and advisory bodies to make them supposedly more accountable, representative and transparent. I alone voted not so much against the motion but for the retention of executive appointments, for continuity, for stability. Some councillors suggested that Legco vet and approve these appointees and that more elected political figures be selected. I could imagine there and then what it might be like with these entities consumed by partisanship and confused about their real purpose and function which are comparable to those of consultants, not politicians. I feared that such members might be keener to offer advice perceived to be popular rather than practical.
Those proposals served up in L~:gco last week also sounded like an attempt to usurp the role and authority of the executive. The Government has always enjoyed the prerogative of appointing people to those commitLees, authorities, boards and commissions based on their track record, personal integrity, intelligence, special knowledge and other less tangible, but invaluable, qualities.
The administration also weighs its appointment on whether those chosen can reach crucial, often difficult, decisions requiring tact, compromise and consensus. There is no question that the system boils down to arbitrariness.
These days ideology and ideals often eclipse common sense in our political dialogue. We in Hong Kong are often prompted to act according to a prescription laid down by the most eloquent activists whose admiration for Western concepts corresponds with their aversion to local conventions .... Democracy may be the by-word of these times. We have been told that all our institutions and our conduct must be seen through the prism of democracy.
To me, democracy is in the offing as spelt out in evolutionary terms in the Basic Law and we should not worry too much about it to the distraction of everything else. (South China Morning Post, 16 May 1996, p. 16.) 
Analysis of Text 4
Text 4 is an article written by a pro-China Legislative Councillor and member of the Provisional Committee. He is well known for his interest in Confucianism and has written articles in the local press on this topic. He is sometimes referred to in the press as "the Confucianist, David Chu". In this article Chu argues against the idea of LEGCO vetting appointments to government statutory and advisory bodies, on the grounds that this would politicise their work. In this text Chu seeks to undermine the values this paper depicts as being associated with a Utilitarian Discourse and to promote those associated with a more Confucianist, as the term is defined in this paper, approach.
In the first paragraph Chu argues that the proposal to review the statutory and advisory bodies was based on the claim that they should be made "more accountable, representative and transparent". The three adjectives "accountable, representative and transparent" have gained great currency in Hong Kong since the arrival of Governor Chris Patten and they are closely identified with Patten and the prodemocracy camp (Flowerdew, 1997) , referring as they do to aspects of the democratic, equitable, open values promoted by the Utilitarian discourse. This explains the use of the hedge, "supposedly", by Chu, who thereby expresses his scepticism with regard to the promotion of such values. Chu argues that his opposition to the motion was motivated by a desire "for continuity, for stability", thereby setting up an opposition and a suggestion of mutual exclusivity between accountability, representativeness and transparency, on the one hand, and continuity and stability, on the other.
In the second paragraph Chu warns of the dangers of those who do accept such values, arguing that the "political figures" who would likely be selected on the proposed basis would be "consumed by partisanship and confused about their real purpose and function" and that they would provide advice which would be "perceived to be popular rather than practical". Here Chu is arguing against the Utilitarian values of representativeness based on popular franchise, a view put forward also by F.Y. Kan in text 2.
Reminiscent of Kan, also, in paragraphs 3 and 4 Chu argues that appointments should be made by those in authority and that they should be based on "track record, personal integrity, intelligence, special knowledge and other less tangible, but invaluable, qualities". Other necessary abilities needed by appointees are "tact, compromise and consensus" (attributes valued within the Confucian discourse). Interestingly, in direct contrast to text 3, where Margaret Ng argues that it is inevitable that the selection system for the chief executive proposed by the China and pro-China side will be biased, Chu states that under the system of executive appointees for the statutory bodies, "There is no question that the system boils down to arbitrariness".
In paragraph 5 Chu overtly directs his attack at the pro-democracy camp and their supporters, accusing them of uncritical adoption of Western values and suggesting that their eloquence is somehow misleading the people of Hong Kong. In setting up the opposition between the "Western concepts" of the "eloquent activists" (i.e. prodemocracy politicians and their supporters), on the one hand and "local conventions", on the other Chu creates the possible implicature that those who support greater democracy are somehow disloyal and do not share the values of local people.
In paragraphs 6 and 7 Chu criticises the emphasis in Hong Kong placed on democracy -"We have been told that all our institutions and our conduct must be seen through the prism of democracy" -arguing that evolution towards democracy is provided for in the Basic Law.
This text presents a number of arguments which seek to undermine the values identified in this paper as being associated with the Utilitarian discourse. First, aspersion is cast on the notions of accountability, representativeness and transparency, on the grounds that they represent a threat to continuity and stability. Second the notion of popular franchise is attacked, on the grounds that elected politicians are likely to play to the gallery of popular opinion rather than take decisions on an impartial basis. Third, the idea of making the statutory bodies more accountable, representative and transparent, is criticised, because the role and authority of the executive would be undermined. In place of the Utilitarian values which this text seeks to undermine, a range of alternatives which this paper has identified as characteristic of the Confucianist discourse is offered. These are, first, the power of the executive in decision making is asserted. Second, a notion of representativeness based on a number of criteria which are detennined by those in power (but which do not include popular franchise) is put forward. Third, value is placed on tact, compromise and consensus in public discourse.
Conclusion
This paper has considered public discourse in transitional Hong Kong in terms of the conflicting forces of the Utilitarian discourse normally associated with the West and the Confucianist style, nonxmlly associated with China and the Chinese people. In characterising the two discourses in such dichotomous terms I am aware that there is a danger of overgeneralizing. However, I hope to have demonstrated through the example discursive events and. texts, how discourses are inherently unstable constructs and that an element of idealisation is necessary if the concept of discourse is to have any value. In addition to the problem of idealisation, two other shortcomings in the analysis should be mentioned. The first of these is that the analysis inevitably suffers from the problem that the analyst is not bi-cultural, but is a product of one of these discourses, having been brought up in Great Britain; the possibility of bias is therefore great. Second, the analysis is likely to be more successful with regard to Utilitarian discourse, because by its very nature this discourse strives for transparency, valuing as it does openness, directness and the expression of opinion; 14 this ,4 The challenge for the analyst hen~ is to sort out what is authentic and what is cosmetic or manipulative. in contrast to Confucianist discourse which is more opaque and values confidentiality, indirectness and silence, thus making analysis more difficult. In this respect, texts 2 and 4 are unusual in openly promoting what is referred to here as the Confucianist discourse.
One way of conceptualizing the clash between the two competing discourses is in terms of the notion of hegemonic struggle. Fairclough (1992: 92) defines hegemony as "leadership as much as domination across the economic, political, cultural and ideological domains of a society". Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses, according to this conceptualisation, are thus competing for hegemony in present day Hong Kong. As Fairclough notes, total hegemony is never achieved more than partially and temporarily. Even if equilibrium were reached in Hong Kong and either a Utilitarian or a Confucianist discourse came to dominate the other, the equilibrium that was reached would still remain unstable, because the Utilitarian and Confucianist discourses are themselves in a state of flux. In the meantime, with the approach of the change of sovereignty in 1997, it is not clear which discourse will predominate: the Utilitarian discourse promoted most notably within the 'Anglo-Saxon' democracies or the Confucianist discourse associated with China and the Chinese people.
